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Abstract
Many scholars and journalists have raised the possibility that the Internet expands 
the divide in public opinion and society by polarizing people’s opinions about 
political issues. Selective exposure to news and civic information is more likely 
to occur on the Internet than in the mass-media-centered environment of the past. 
This study focused on cyber-racism, such as the “Alt-Right” in the U.S. and “Netto-
uyoku” in Japan. We examined the relations between the polarization of xenophobic 
attitudes and the frequency of exposure to online news on PCs/smartphones. We 
used data from online questionnaire surveys conducted in the U.S. and Japan in 
2016. The results of quantile regression analyses showed that in Japan exposure 
to online news via PCs signifi cantly expanded the polarization of users’ attitudes, 
whereas in the U.S. it shifted the attitudes uniformly toward an anti-xenophobic 
direction. These findings suggest that social, political, and cultural contexts 
infl uence the occurrence of opinion polarization on the Internet.
Key words: opinion polarization, cyber racism, selective exposure to information, 
quantile regression analysis
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1. The Problem of Xenophobia and the Internet
In recent years, the rise of xenophobic nationalism in developed countries has garnered 
much attention worldwide. In 2016, the U.K. decided to leave the EU in a referendum due to 
a strong reaction toward the increase in the country’s immigrants and refugees from Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East. In the U.S. presidential elections, Donald Trump, who explicitly 
stated xenophobic assertions, upset most expectations and became President. Extreme right 
parties and candidates who advocate anti-immigration policies are gaining votes in the 
presidential and general elections of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria.
It is often stated that the Internet is promoting the expansion of xenophobia in relation to 
political trends. In the U.S., the “Alt-Right,” which gained attention in the recent presidential 
election, is a symbolic example. Ikeda (2017: 185) states that the activities of those who 
advocate white supremacy are “limited mainly to the Internet;” but, “it is not just something 
that can be handled lightly,” because “the speed in which discourse disseminates on the 
Internet is far from what it used to be, and it is easy to form one’s own convictions regardless 
of the truth of the discourse.”
Japan’s Alt-Right is called “Netto-uyoku.” Their presence on the Internet began to stand 
out in the early 2000s, and around 2006, they began to feature in major newspapers. Their 
activities gradually moved offl ine, and hate demonstrations took place on the streets (Yasuda 
2012). This movement resulted in the Hate Speech Elimination Law, which was passed by the 
National Diet in 2016.
Formerly, it was not easy for these exclusionists to disseminate their claims widely to the 
public and mobilize participants to join their activities. Leading media companies do not tend 
to repeat their extreme speech, and it is costly for exclusionists to prepare media on their own 
to spread their claims. The expansion of the Internet has changed that situation. The role of the 
Internet in mobilizing xenophobic speech and activity has been confi rmed in interviews and 
surveys with activists in empirical studies conducted in Japan and overseas (Higuchi 2014, 
Perry & Scrivens 2016).
Is information exposure on the Internet strengthening the xenophobic attitudes and 
opinions of the non-activist, general public? There are many more xenophobic opinions and 
commentaries on the Internet than there were in the old mass media-centric information 
environment, and exposure is easier. It appears to suffi ce just considering the possibility of 
that kind of utilization. Intuitively, the relationship seems to work naturally. Many critics who 
view the Internet as a danger have assembled discussions on that point as a semi-implicit 
premise.
However, there is also much information and criticism on the Internet that convey the 
serious harm caused by xenophobic movements. It may be enough to consider the possibility 
that they seek to neutralize the influence of the xenophobic discourse. However, based 
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on the prevailing views of current studies on the Internet (detailed in Section 2), further 
possibilities can be envisioned. Those who originally were sympathetic toward xenophobia 
become exposed to the information conforming to their own predispositions, which can lead 
to an intensification of the xenophobic attitude. Meanwhile, those who have a pre-existing 
critical attitude toward xenophobia, by making selective contact with the information they 
prefer, further strengthen their anti-xenophobia attitude. Thus, the Internet can exert so-called 
“polarization.”
There are only a few quantitative survey researches on xenophobia and nationalism that 
have examined the effects of the Internet on both Japan and abroad,1) and none of them 
assumed the possibility of “polarization” effects. Hence, this study analyzes how news 
exposure on the Internet relates to users’ xenophobic attitudes based on web survey data 
conducted in Japan and the U.S.
Section 2 provides an overview of previous research on the mechanism by which the 
“polarization” effect occurs, and Section 3 pinpoints the methodological problems in existing 
research and presents a new alternative: the application of quantile regression.
2. The Internet and the “Polarization” of Attitudes and Opinion
People have a predisposition to be selective about the news and information they consume. 
This fact was revealed more than half a century ago. Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) conducted 
a survey on the 1940 U.S. presidential election, and the majority of voters who were 
Republicans were exclusively in touch with the Republican election campaign, and the same 
was true for Democrat voters.
At present, selective exposure to information on the Internet has become much easier than it 
would have been during the age of mass media. The constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein was 
the fi rst to express concern over this situation (Sunstein 2000, 2017). The process by which 
the public balances and discusses diverse opinions is important for democracy. However, the 
acceleration of selective exposure to information on the Internet may erode the foundation of 
democratic public opinion formation. Information-fi ltering technology used in social media, 
such as Facebook, can further increase the risk; for instance, the development of the “fi lter 
bubble” on the web automatically selects and presents news according to a user’s preference 
(Paliser 2011).
The computational social scientists Del Vicario et al. (2016), who analyzed information 
dissemination on Facebook, clarified that users’ networks are differentiated into 2 clusters: 
one that prefers scientifi c news, and another that prefers conspiracy news, both of which occur 
through selective exposure to information. Scientific and conspiracy news are distributed 
1)  As far as we can see, there is only 1 observable case from Hyun et al. (2014) abroad; in Japan, it is only in the studies 
of Tsuji (2009, 2017) and Taka (2015).
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exclusively in homogeneous clusters of respective preferences, and each cluster has less 
exposure to the other type of news. Users with similar attitudes and opinions form a closed 
network where only specifi c types of information circulate and are amplifi ed. It is the “echo 
chamber” effect.
Communication divided into homogenous subgroups (clusters) shows a tendency for “group 
polarization” of attitudes and opinions. This process was repeatedly confi rmed in experimental 
studies in social psychology even before the appearance of the Internet (Arima 2012). For 
example, if a group discusses a certain topic and the average value of the group’s opinion 
was originally in favor, then after the discussion, the group has a further tendency to gear 
toward the in-favor opinion. Likewise, in a group that originally opposes an opinion, there is a 
tendency to further opposition. Hence, when the in-favor and opposing sides divide and have 
discussions separately, they will each be biased toward the extremes, overall. At the level of 
each subgroup (part), attitudes and opinions intensify at the opposite ends of the pole, and the 
differentiation into two poles at the overall level is called group polarization.
Several experimental studies have found that group polarization is more likely to occur in 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) situations, such as on the Internet, than in face-
to-face situations (Spears et al. 1990, Latané & L’Herrou 1996, etc.).2) In the echo chamber 
on the web, group polarization online — a “cyber cascade” (Sunstein 2017) — is likely to 
progress more rapidly. As a result, the division of public opinion and confrontations in society 
can intensify.
In the age of mass media, the researchers focused on the media’s infl uence to change public 
opinion uniformly in one direction. Presently, the composition of the polarization effect, the 
problem of the Internet age, is more complicated. The Internet can make each cluster within 
its echo chamber have stronger attitudes and opinions that lean in a specifi c direction even 
more than mass media could. It aggregates and differentiates the whole population into 
a distribution of attitudes and opinions on two poles, unlike mass media. The meaning of 
“polarization” differs at the part/whole levels, which is where it gets confusing.
The polarization of attitudes and opinions on the Internet is often explained as “confi rmation 
bias” (Klayman & Ha 1987). Those with preconceptions, prejudices, and stereotypes are likely 
to pay attention to the information and examples that match them, and they will ignore those 
that do not match (Snyder and Swann 1978). This phenomenon is confi rmation bias, and it is 
more likely to work in the echo chambers of the Internet by facilitating access to information 
consistent with one’s own predispositions. Original attitudes and opinions are further 
2) However, these studies do not argue that CMC is prone to group polarization from a technologically deterministic 
point of view. For example, Spears et al. (1990) consider group membership in a CMC situation to promote 
conformity with group norms (de-individualization) and cause group polarization phenomena (SIDE theory). This 
seems to be a suggestive view that can also be applied in situations where xenophobia is a problem (a situation where 
in-group membership is emphasized relative to outside the group), as in this study.
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strengthened, and polarization occurs.3) In fact, the results of the online field experiments 
conducted by Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (2015), show that selective exposure is observed in 
news searches on the web and that attitudes are strengthened by confi rmation bias.
3. Developing a New Appropriate Methodology to Analyze Polarization
There are relatively few analyses of social survey data in empirical studies on the 
polarization of attitudes and opinions on the Internet. Many of these studies set up controlled 
experimental condition situations. However, the results obtained from controlled situations 
do not necessarily reflect actual situations. Therefore, verification based on survey data is 
necessary. For selective exposure to information on the Internet, which is a prerequisite for 
polarization, there are many cases where the findings obtained from a controlled situation 
were not confi rmed in the survey (Iyenger et al. 2008).
There have been a few recent attempts to identify causality using longitudinal panel survey 
data, such as in Barberá (2015) and Boxell et al. (2017). In one cross-sectional survey, if 
there was a link between Internet usage and polarization of attitude, whether it was <Internet 
usage leads to → polarization of attitude> or <the more extreme an attitude a person holds 
→ the more frequent his or her Internet usage to access information that matches his or 
her preferences>, the direction of causality was not clear. Barberá’s (2015) study suggests 
an interesting causal effect: the use of social media encourages 
moderation rather than the polarization of political attitudes. 
However, when the study constructed the indicator variables of 
polarization, it used the “folding” method, which has problems, as 
discussed below. Hence, doubts remain in the validity and reliability 
of the study’s analysis results. The problem is also deeply connected 
to the diffi culties inherent in the analysis of polarization by survey 
data. This issue will be explained in order. 
For the sake of simplicity, consider a simple case in which the 
attitude Y is polarized only by factor X, as shown in Figure 1. 
For example, whether the Y-axis is against accepting immigrants 
(+direction) or in favor (-direction), it indicates the positive or 
negative opinion and its degree. It is assumed that the X-axis is the 
frequency of exposure with news on the Internet (x2 is higher in 
frequency than x1). Figure 1 indicates that the higher the frequency 
3) Confi rmation bias theory has the advantage of being able to explain why information is easily received and diffused 
in specifi c groups, even in the case of “fake news,” which is wildly unreliable (Quattrociocchi 2017). This point is 
hard to explain in group polarization theory. It can be an important perspective in pursuing research on the current 
“post-truth” phenomenon.
x1 x2
y 
0
FIGURE 1. 
Schematic of Polarization
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of news exposure, the more divided the opinion of the target group is against/in favor of 
accepting immigrants.
In general, OLS (ordinary least squares) regression analysis is used when the value of the 
dependent variable y is defi ned and predicted by the independent variable x. Assuming that 
the regression coeffi cient of x is a, the intercept is b, and the error factor is e, the equation that 
defi nes y is expressed as
yi = axi + b + ei
In this case, what defi nes a change in the value of independent variable x is the change in 
the average value of dependent variable y. However, in Figure 1, the average value of y at x1 
and its average value at x2 do not change ( y ̅ 1 = y ̅ 2 ). What changes is based on the value of x, 
which is the variance, not the average value of y. OLS regression analysis is not used to defi ne 
and predict changes in the variance of the dependent variable y due to independent variable x. 
This is the fi rst problem.4)
The solution to this problem, which is almost the current de facto standard, is to construct a 
dependent variable that means the degree of polarity by “folding” the value of the dependent 
variable at a reference point, such as the median or mean value (Brannon et al. 2007, Wojcieszak 
& Rojas 2011, Lee et al. 2014, Barberá 2015, Lee 2016, Boxell et al. 2017). In Figure 1, variable 
y’ is formed by an absolute value conversion with y=0 as the reference point. The value of y’ 
increases as the attitudes and opinions towards immigration acceptance become stronger and 
more extreme, whether they are in favor or against. Through this operation, Figure 1 is converted 
into Figure 2, and OLS regression analysis is performed. 
Since independent variable x changes the average value of y’ 
(degree of polarity), the fi rst problem is avoided. However, a second 
problem remains. If attitude and opinion y is polarized due to the 
frequency of news exposure on the Internet x, it could be assumed 
that the infl uence of news exposure frequency x is harder to accept 
as the original preconceived tendency on immigration acceptance 
becomes neither in favor nor against (as y or y’ becomes closer to 
0). The motivation to selectively connect with information that is 
neither in favor nor against is small, and the possibility of being in 
that environment is less likely.
Figures 1 and 2 assume such a case. Hence, even in Figure 2, the variance of y is larger in 
x2 than in x1. The fact that the variance of dependent variable y’ changes with independent 
variable x means that the error term e changes along with independent variable x in the 
4) From a perspective that partially overlaps with our study, Rodrigo & Ato (2002) point out methodological problems 
in previous studies that analyzed group polarization. However, their proposed alternative is an analysis method that 
assumes data obtained from an experimental situation, which is diffi cult to apply to the social survey data our study 
uses.
FIGURE 2. 
“Folding” conversion of
the dependent variable
x1 x2
y’ 
0
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previous regression equation. In OLS regression analysis, the precondition is that independent 
variable x and error term e are independent (unrelated) of each other. Figure 2 violates this 
assumption, and proper estimation may not be possible with OLS regression analysis.
In this study, quantile regression analysis is used to overcome the problems described 
above. For a summary of the statistical explanation and application of quantile regression, 
please refer to Hao & Naiman (2007). Here, only the essential points will be explained.
In OLS regression, one assumes a multivariate normal distribution of dependent variables 
and estimates the mean value from the independent variables, whereas in quantile regression, 
arbitrary quantiles can be inferred without assuming a specific distribution, such as 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile (1st quartile), 50th percentile (median value), and so on. For 
example, in Figure 1, the upper end of the distribution of the dependent variable y, that is, the 
people with a strong xenophobic attitude, is estimated by quantile regression, aiming at the 
90th percentile point, 75th percentile point, etc. The coeffi cient value of independent variable 
x is positive, and the coeffi cient value of the 90th percentile point is larger than the coeffi cient 
value of the 75th percentile point. Conversely, the lower end of the distribution of y (the 
people with a strong anti-xenophobic attitude) is inferred by the 10th percentile point, 25th 
percentile point, and so on. The coeffi cient value of x is negative, and the absolute value of the 
coeffi cient is larger at the 10th percentile point than at the 25th percentile point. By comparing 
the analysis results of multiple quantiles, it is possible to examine how the distribution 
(variance) of dependent variable y changes depending on independent variable x.
To the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies using quantile regression to analyze the 
polarization of attitudes. This study will be the fi rst.
4. Survey Data and Variables Used for Analysis
The data collected from a self-administered web survey questionnaire conducted in Japan 
and the U.S. was used for the analysis. Among the registered monitors of web research 
companies in each country, the subjects were 15- to 69-year-old residents of metropolitan 
areas (Tokyo and New York). The target number of samples collected was assigned in 
proportion to the population distribution of gender and 10-year age division for each country. 
The survey period was September 23 to October 3, 2016 in Japan, and September 21 to 
October 11, 2016 in the U.S. The number of collected samples was 1000 for both countries, 
and the number of valid responses after data cleaning was 951 in Japan and 987 in the U.S. 
Please refer to Kitamura et al. (2018) for the details of the survey.
Below is an analytical model assuming that a change in the xenophobic attitude (polarization) 
occurs due to exposure to Internet news. As mentioned in the previous section, the causality of 
this direction has not been confi rmed in previous studies; however, this issue is not limited to 
polarization research. It is less important to identify causal direction if no relationship between 
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the variables is observed. Thus, the general research procedure usually starts with examining 
whether expected relations can be observed before it moves on to more difficult causal 
identifi cations. This study’s analysis is the fi rst step to future causality estimations, based on 
the appropriate methods.
For the dependent variables, the answers to 8 questions on xenophobic attitudes were 
analyzed into their principal components. We used the 1st principal score obtained. As 
presented in Table 1, the principal component loading for each item shows similar patterns 
in Japan and the U.S. These 8 items were adopted from the 2013 National Identity Survey of 
the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). They are some of the most commonly asked 
questions in quantitative studies on nationalism.
TABLE 1.
Results of the principal component analysis of 8 xenophobic attitudes (load quantity)
JAPAN U.S.
1. Immigrants increase crime rates.  .39  .40
2. Immigrants are generally good for Japan’s/America’s economy. -.37 -.36
3. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Japan/America.  .33  .41
4. Immigrants improve Japanese/American society by bringing new ideas and cultures. -.41 -.38
5. Japanese/American culture is generally undermined by immigrants.  .41  .34
6. Legal immigrants to Japan/America who are not citizens should have the same rights as Japanese/
American citizens.
-.38 -.24
7. Japan/America should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants  .19  .38
8. Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as Japanese/American citizens -.29 -.28
Eigenvalue 2.69 3.43
 
For the independent variable, we use the frequencies of news exposure on the Internet using 
a “PC/tablet” and a “smartphone/cellphone.” Past studies by Tsuji (2017) and Taka (2015) 
used total Internet usage time. Since a considerable amount of this time may include usage 
for associating and interacting with friends, it is not applicable as an indicator of information 
exposure, which is the focus of polarization research.5) The former will be referred to as the 
“PC Internet news exposure” scale, and the latter will be the “MB Internet news exposure” 
scale. The questionnaire had 6 questions regarding how much the respondents use the PC/
MB to “watch and read” each of the 3 news genres: “society,” “international,” and “politics.” 
They were marked in descending order of frequency on a scale of 6 to 1. The answers to these 
3 questions were summed up to construct a “frequency of Internet news exposure on a PC/
MB” scale. Cronbach’s α, an indicator of the internal consistency of the scale, was 0.96 in 
Japan/0.80 in the U.S. for the PC Internet scale, and 0.97/0.90 respectively for the MB Internet 
scale.
5) News exposure may also be a side effect of using the Internet for social exchange purposes. However, secondary 
news exposure is included since the question to be taken as an independent variable is: “How long do you watch and 
read the following news on the Internet?”
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Control variables include: the demographic variables of the respondents (gender, age, 
academic background, household income, and ethnicity for the U.S. only), frequency of news 
exposure through TV/newspaper, and 3 variables, namely: general trust, tolerance, loneliness 
(solitude), which are indicated among the psychological tendencies of individuals with 
xenophobic attitudes, as pointed out in previous research (Kim 2015, Tsuji 2017, etc.).
TABLE 2.
Descriptive statistics of each variable used for analysis
JAPAN U.S.
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD
Xenophobic attitude
principal component score -3.36~3.87 0 1 -2.20~2.95 0 1
Gender dummy (Male) 0~1 0.49 0.50 0~1 0.50 0.50
Age 15~69 43.98 14.95 15~69 41.34 15.37
Education 2~6 4.46 0.92 1~6 4.62 1.08
Household annual income
(Million¥ / 10,000$) 1~16 5.95 3.89 1.75~16 7.67 4.50
Ethnicity dummy (Caucasian) --- --- --- 0~1 0.72 0.45
General trust 3~15 8.93 2.25 3~15 10.38 2.78
Tolerance 1~5 2.96 0.97 1~5 3.05 1.24
Loneliness 3~15 7.77 2.92 3~15 7.65 3.71
News exposure frequency: TV 1~6 5.14 1.43 1~6 4.93 1.40
News exposure frequency: Newspaper 1~6 3.26 1.99 1~6 3.59 1.62
News exposure frequency: PC Internet 3~18 12.30 5.35 3~18 11.70 4.42
News exposure frequency: MB Internet 3~18 9.23 5.96 3~18 10.05 5.29
A dummy variable is used for gender, with 1 for male and 0 for female. Academic 
background is set as 1-6 for graduating (or currently attending) “elementary school;” “junior 
high;” “senior high;” “junior college, technical college, vocation school;” “university;” or 
“graduate school.” Household annual income is divided into 8 categories of “less than 2 
million yen” to “over 14 million yen,” for Japan/ 10 categories of “less than $35,000” to “more 
than $140,000” in the U.S. For each category, a median value is assigned (“over 14 million 
yen” and “more than $140,000” are converted to 16 million yen and $160,000, respectively). 
In the U.S., the ethnicity variable is set to 1 for “White or Caucasian” and 0 for all others. The 
frequency of news exposure through TV/newspaper is set as 6 to 1 for “several times a day” to 
“do not watch or read.”
The following 3 items were given for the psychological scale of general trust (Yamagishi 
1998): “most people are basically honest,” “most people are trustworthy,” and “most people 
are trustful of others.” For each item, the answers included “I think so” to “I do not think 
so” and were assigned values from 5 to 1. A summed-up scale variable was constructed 
(Japan α=.78/ U.S. .84). To arrive at the variable of intolerance of others who are different, 
we reversed the answer value to the item “I don’t really want to socialize with people whose 
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values differ from my own.” For loneliness, the Japanese version of the UCLA Loneliness 
Scale (Moroi 1991) was used; the three items include: “I lack companionship,” “There is no 
one I can turn to,” and “People are around me but not with me” were asked and summed up 
(α=.78/.83).
Quantile regression analysis is performed using the above variables (see Table 2 for the 
descriptive statistics of each variable). In addition to the 25/50/75 percentiles, the quantile 
point of the assumed dependent variable is the group of “Netto-uyoku”—who strongly hold 
xenophobic attitudes—as operationally defi ned in Tsuji (2017). It is about 2% of the sample 
and set to the 90/95 percentile at the top of the distribution and the 5/10 percentile at the 
bottom. The bootstrap method was used to estimate the standard error. According to Hao 
& Naiman (2007), since the number of re-samplings to estimate the standard error with the 
bootstrap method is 500-2000 as a standard, it is set to 2000 times. To ensure that the results 
can be replicated, the initial value of the random number generator is set to 1,234,567. Stata 
15.1 was used for the analysis.
5. Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the quantile regression analysis for Japan and the U.S., 
respectively. For reference, the result of the OLS regression analysis using the principal 
component score of xenophobic attitude as the dependent variable and the result of using 
the absolute value converted into polarity score (see Section 3) as the dependent variable are 
appended.
First, let’s observe the effect of the control variables. In Japan, a positive effect of being 
male linked to a xenophobic attitude is observable in many quantiles. In the U.S., age, 
ethnicity (Caucasian), and household income have a positive effect, while educational 
background showed a negative effect. These effects can also be observed from OLS regression 
analysis using a raw score as a dependent variable. For the variables of the psychological 
tendencies, for both countries, general trust and tolerance are negative in most of the quantiles, 
while loneliness is positive in most of the quantiles. These fi ndings are consistent with those 
in previous studies.
The frequency of news exposure through TV has no significant effect on almost any 
quantile in either country. The same is true for newspapers. However, in the results of the OLS 
regression analysis in the U.S., signifi cant positive effects can be observed. In the U.S., the 
conversion of newspapers to partisan media has often been mentioned in recent scholarship. 
These results can mean that individuals often can consume newspapers geared toward their 
own partisanship.
11
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TABLE 3.
Results of quantile regression/OLS regression: Japan
Quantile regression OLS regression
(n=951) q.05 q.10 q.25 q.50 q.75 q.90 q.95 rawscore
polarity
score
(constant term) -.450 -.188 .191 .816** 1.647*** 2.957*** 4.113*** 1.137*** .986***
Gender dummy .306† .258† .121 .190** .106† -.087 .044 .167* -.017
Age .002 .001 -.004 -.003 .000 -.003 -.008 -.001 .001
Education -.073 -.077 .025 .015 -.010 .054 -.139 -.020 -.012
Household income -.024 -.020 .000 -.005 -.008 .005 .004 -.005 .001
General trust -.069 -.024 -.050* -.060*** -.065*** -.160*** -.190*** -.075*** -.031**
Tolerance -.196*** -.205*** -.205*** -.176*** -.218*** -.346*** -.208† -.213*** .008
Loneliness .030 .045* .067*** .043*** .018 .012 .006 .038*** -.017*
News exposure: TV .062 .010 -.007 .013 -.010 .002 .011 .004 -.005
News exposure: Newspaper .052 .025 .013 -.018 -.016 -.018 -.003 -.008 -.017
News exposure: PC Internet -.030* -.023† -.001 .000 .002 .027† .050** .001 .010*
News exposure: MB Internet .004 -.005 -.022* -.010* -.001 .009 .012 -.005 .008*
pseudo-R2 / adj.R2 .086 .076 .075 .069 .059 .096 .112 .102*** .019*
Notes: signifi cance level;  *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10
TABLE 4.
Results of quantile regression/OLS regression: U.S.
Quantile regression OLS regression
(n=987) q.05 q.10 q.25 q.50 q.75 q.90 q.95 rawscore
polarity
score
(constant term) -1.996*** -1.519** -.878* .361 1.326*** 1.840*** 2.856*** .329 1.534***
Gender dummy .061 .150 .156 .088 .052 .088 .040 .116† -.022
Age .011* .012* .009* .009** .011*** .016** .007 .011*** .000
Education -.132† -.188* -.151*** -.158*** -.126*** -.075 -.087 -.159*** .002
Household income .021 .014 .023† .016† .021* .009 .025 .021** -.002
Ethnicity dummy .356* .558** .410** .369*** .215*** .343*** .476** .371*** -.020
General trust -.003 -.017 -.013 -.032* -.051*** -.070*** -.058† -.038** -.024**
Tolerance -.039 -.082 -.150** -.137** -.161*** -.195*** -.206** -.155*** -.034*
Loneliness .048* .060* .073*** .060*** .021* .012 -.014 .043*** -.016**
News exposure: TV .067 .073 .066† .018 .012 -.033 .007 .035 -.043**
News exposure: Newspaper .036 .066† .090* .042 .036 .055† .039 .057** -.014
News exposure: PC Internet -.062*** -.068*** -.060*** -.036*** -.017 -.017 -.044* -.039*** .009
News exposure: MB Internet .019 .026† .018 .009 -.006 -.008 -.016 .009 -.008
pseudo-R2 / adj.R2 .103 .123 .135 .097 .094 .137 .138 .174*** .039***
Notes: signifi cance level;  *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10
The results concerning the main topic, the frequency of news exposure on the Internet, are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4. In Japan, a negative effect with the signifi cance of p<.05 or <.10 at 
the 5/10 percentile point is shown for PC Internet exposure, while a positive effect is shown 
at the 90/95 percentile point, as shown in Table 3. The absolute value of the coeffi cients also 
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increased as they reached both ends and a significant difference of p<.05 as a whole was 
observed at the coeffi cient values of the nine quantile points using the Wald test.6) This result 
suggests that PC Internet news exposure has the (bi-) polarization effect of attitudes, namely, 
the people with stronger predisposition of xenophobia become even stronger, and likewise, the 
weaker people becomes even weaker.
Interestingly, contrasting results are observed for MB Internet news exposure. MB Internet 
exposure was found to have no signifi cant effect on either end layers, and the median 25th 
percentile and 50th percentile showed signifi cant negative effects. We can interpret this result 
as follows. Due to the differences of display size and operability between PCs and MBs 
(smartphones and mobile phones), the former is generally easier to use and thus facilitates 
selective access to information according to users’ predispositions. Rather than selective 
exposure, if MBs are used to consume news in general, the result concerning MB Internet 
news exposure means the effect of such news in general.
Previous studies of mass media effects show that media is more likely to affect the 
audiences regarding issues which they are less involved in or which are less associated with 
their predispositions (Klapper 1957). Assuming that exposure to the news in general through 
MBs has the effect of promoting attitude changes toward anti-xenophobia, the effect will 
appear in people with neither xenophobic nor anti-xenophobic predispositions, i.e., in those 
who are located around the middle, the 50th percentile. However, this point cannot be verifi ed 
from the survey data and is merely a hypothesis. A follow-up investigation will be a task for 
the future.
As shown in Table 4, in the U.S., news exposure through MB Internet has no signifi cant 
effect on any quantile.7) Meanwhile, news exposure through PC Internet shows a signifi cantly 
negative effect on 5 of the 7 quantiles. The coefficient values in the other 2 quantiles are 
also negative. There is no signifi cant difference in the coeffi cient values of each quantile as 
a whole, even with the Wald test. For the U.S., news exposure through PC Internet does not 
cause polarization of xenophobic attitudes. Rather, it has the effect of weakening xenophobic 
attitudes uniformly from both ends toward the center. These effects can be properly estimated 
by OLS regression. The analysis results may seem surprising when considering that the 
6) Furthermore, when the difference of each coefficient value is compared in pairs, the coefficient value of the 5th 
percentile point has a significant difference with all quantile points other than the 10th percentile point. The 
coeffi cient value of the 10th percentile point has a signifi cant difference with all quantile points other than the 5th. 
The same applies to the coeffi cient values of the 90/95 percentile points. A signifi cant difference was also observed 
between the above and all other quantiles except with each other. However, the 90th percentile point has a p<.10 
reference level difference with the 25-75th percentile points.
7) In the regression analysis of the U.S. data, MB Internet news exposure shows VIF=2.47, and PC Internet news 
exposure shows a relatively high value of VIF=2.03. The effects of MB Internet may not have been separated 
well. However, the results (coeffi cient values) for the independent and control variables that remain in the analysis 
without MB Internet have basically no signifi cant change. In general, for VIF, 5 to 10 or more are taken as a measure 
of multicollinearity, but “in social survey data of individuals, the recommendation is a VIF of 2 or less by strict 
estimation” (Hayashi 2014: 96).
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polarization of public opinions on the Internet is often pointed out in the U.S. However, note 
that this study utilized Internet users living in New York—a liberal, east coast metropolitan 
area—as subjects. Given the nature of this survey, there are some reservations as to whether 
the analysis results can be extended throughout the U.S.
Finally, here are some considerations for the validity of the OLS regression analysis using 
the polarity score. In the quantile regression of the Japanese data, news exposure through 
PC Internet showed a relatively clear polarization effect. News exposure with PC Internet 
shows signifi cant coeffi cient values even in OLS regression analysis with polarity score as 
a dependent variable. In this case, it seems that polarization has been captured successfully. 
However, signifi cant coeffi cient values are also shown for news exposures with MB Internet. 
Actually, according to the results of quantile regression analysis as mentioned above, the 
effect of MB Internet is a different pattern from polarization. Hence, OLS regression analysis 
using the polarity score as a dependent variable may lead to false inferences and conclusions; 
it may be a dubious methodology for validity.
6. Summary of Conclusions and Future Work
The analysis in the previous section suggests that in the Japanese data, news exposure 
through PC Internet has the effect of polarizing xenophobic attitudes and opinions. Few 
previous studies have examined the impact of the Internet on xenophobic attitudes, and 
previous research on the polarization effect of the Internet from social survey data is 
practically non-existent in Japan. Our fi ndings from the analysis are important for fi lling in 
this gap.
However, no polarization effect was observed for news exposure through MB Internet. 
In the U.S. data, no polarization effect was observed for either PC or MB Internet news 
exposure. The information environment of the Internet does not define users’ selective 
information exposure behavior in a technologically deterministic manner. It strongly suggests 
that information exposure behavior and its consequences (effects on the user) changes 
depending on the context of usage. That includes whether the news is accessed using a PC or a 
smartphone and the social, political, or cultural background of the user. Therefore, the fi ndings 
in this study is negative for the “filter bubble” hypothesis, where information conforming 
to the users’ preference is automatically selected on the web, and as its consequences the 
user passively experiences the effects of the polarization of attitudes and opinions.8) Rather, 
researchers should observe more closely a role of the context of specifi c usage and the social, 
political, and cultural backgrounds on how users’ active selection of information leads to the 
8) This fi nding of our study are consistent with the study of Bakshy et al. (2015). They analyzed big data obtained from 
Facebook, and found that a user’s individual behavior of selection was more closely related to the selective exposure 
of information rather than news feeds due to algorithmic ranking.
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polarization of their attitudes. This study clarifi es the interaction between information behavior 
and the socio-cultural context around it, which means there is a large area sociologists and 
social psychologists can research.
Since the survey used in this study was not originally designed to examine the effect of the 
Internet on xenophobic attitudes, the variables (questions) available for analysis were limited. 
For example, the survey lacks questions on selective exposure to information and news. Our 
analysis is in line with the process assumed by polarization theory and remains inadequate. 
If the polarization of attitudes and opinions comes from information exposure through PC 
Internet, it is necessary to study whether it is due to “confi rmation bias,” cited in Section 2; 
the “mere exposure effect” (Zajonc 1968), which refers to repeated exposure to homogeneous 
information in the echo chamber; or a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann 1993), where the 
recognition of opinion distribution in the surroundings (or society as a whole) is biased.
The biggest issue is, as mentioned in Section 4, the verifi cation of causality. In this study, 
we discussed the theoretical problems of OLS regression analysis using the polarization index 
variable by the “folding” method. We showed that there are cases where it may actually lead 
to false inferences and conclusions (as in the effect of MB Internet usage in the analysis of 
the Japanese data). In this regard, existing research that attempts to identify the causes of 
the polarization effect also lacks methodological validity and reliability. Hence, there is a 
need to revise the base analysis method. Causality estimation based on quantile regression 
is far more difficult than with OLS regression. However, methods for quantile regression 
using longitudinal survey data or instrumental variables are being developed (Koenker et 
al. Eds. 2018). The authors of this study will actively work on clarifying causality using the 
appropriate methodologies.
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